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Highlights
 – Current EU involvement in the regulation of TSO revenues and transmission grid 
tarification is rather limited and the existing heterogeneity among national regula-
tory practices and transmission tariff structures might be an obstacle for function-
ing competition and adequate investments in the grids.
 – However, we see neither the need nor solid justification for an EU-wide harmoni-
zation of the regulation of TSO revenues. ACER should take the responsibility for 
benchmarking national regulatory practices. Transparency standards should be 
extended. Innovative solutions to trigger investments (e.g. competitive tendering 
or a European tariff component) need to be considered. The EU shall call for the 
removal of legal barriers that might impede grid investments; it is notably neces-
sary that third parties can invest where incumbent TSOs do not show interest to 
realize identified priority projects. 
 – To increase transparency, the cost components included in electricity transmis-
sion tariffs should be harmonized; they should only include costs related to trans-
mission grid infrastructure. Locational signals providing reliable ex-ante signals 
should be introduced. To avoid a distortion in competition, the EU should fix an 
average share of the G/L-components; thus, introduce a minimum G-component. 
The behavior of grid users in the competitive sector must not be distorted, i.e. 
transmission tariffs covering the long-term cost of infrastructure should not be 
calculated based on energy transported (i.e. in €/MWh). 
 – In the European natural gas sector, there are more than 30 entry-exit zones with 
mainly administratively determined borders. The EU should set principles for de-
termining the ideal size of entry-exit zones, but let concerned NRAs and TSOs 
agree on the result. Once market areas are merged, there are good economic rea-
sons to implement a system of common tarification. The role for the EU here 
should be limited to support sound agreements between the respective stakehold-
ers.
 – We recommend some harmonization in natural gas transmission tarification to 
ensure that the breakdown of costs among grid users and among entry- and exit 
points respects the principle of cost-reflectiveness as much as possible. Adequate 
discounts on short-haul transports should be encouraged. Asymmetric re-alloca-
tion of costs, such that ‘captive’ domestic consumers have to bear disproportion-
ately high costs, shall be prohibited.
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Background
The current EU involvement in the regulation of TSO reve-
nues and transmission grid tarification is limited and mainly 
addresses issues related to interconnection and supply secu-
rity as well as the definition of underlying principles for third 
party grid access and capacity pricing. Heterogeneity among 
national, or even local transmission tariffs might be an obsta-
cle for functioning competition and adequate investments into 
the grids in the context of EU energy policy goals (i.e. “2014”, 
“2020”, and “2050”). Even though transmission tariffs account 
only for a small percentage of final industrial consumer elec-
tricity and natural gas prices, both their level and structure 
can have a strong impact on infrastructure investments and 
on how commodities are traded within and between countries.
In what follows, we derive recommendations on the future role 
of the EU and a potential need for harmonizing transmission 
grid tarification. We ask (1) whether existing heterogeneities 
in regulatory practice might hamper adequate investments 
or impede efficient competition and, if yes, (2) whether new 
EU legislation in place and new EU instruments notably from 
the Third Package – once enforced – provide an efficient solu-
tion. Increased trans-national involvement may have benefits, 
such as the better functioning of markets and the facilitation 
of infrastructure development, but it also comes at a cost, 
such as increased information asymmetry between individual 
decision makers and higher-level coordinating or regulating 
institutions. Both have to be weighed carefully. Practical and 
political implementability of the proposed solutions (both in 
the near- or long-term) is one of our key concerns.
Regulation of TSO revenues: A national 
undertaking?
The observed heterogeneity in general price control mecha-
nisms and instruments used to promote new investments 
probably does not hamper adequate investments in national 
infrastructures having no strong cross-border impact. Key pa-
rameters determining investment incentives are an adequate 
risk-reward ratio, regulatory stability and transparency, all is-
sues national regulators can properly address. In addition, the 
current heterogeneity regarding instruments used to promote 
investments can actually provide valuable insights into ‘func-
Analytical framework for the analysis of policy measures going beyond the national level
Any EU involvement must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the high-level objectives in the EU Treaties, except for areas 
of EU exclusive competences. To discover the need and pertinence of policy measures going beyond national level, three questions 
are to be answered: 
#1 - First, whether EU involvement is justified on the grounds of subsidiarity. Any higher European level of decision-making shall 
avoid pre-empting any area of legitimate Member State involvement. From an institutional perspective, there are shared compe-
tences between Member States and the EU regarding the achievement of the European energy policy goals – i.e. the completion 
of the internal market, a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy system, and security of energy supplies (Art. 194, Treaty 
of the Functioning of the EU). It is then legitimate to look at this more closely to see if there are substantial economic benefits to be 
made from a renewed EU involvement.
#2 - Second, whether the achievement of policy targets is hindered by profound and permanent market failures. In the presence 
of strong (positive or negative) externalities, decentralized decision-making will not result in the socially optimal investments from 
a regional or an EU-wide perspective. Distributional concerns occur as soon as multiple stakeholders are involved and diverging 
interests can hamper efficient decision making. Trans-national involvement can also be important to stimulate information benefits 
we can get from various national regulatory authorities being learning from their diverse regulatory approaches.
#3 - And finally, whether the necessary regulatory actions could be decentralized among various local players and whether objec-
tives could be achieved based on voluntary, regional cooperation, instead of being the result of top-down, centralised decision-
making to get a workable implementation process.
3Policy Brief 2012/01
Florence School of Regulation
tioning’ models and might allow to discover ‘best practice’ for 
specific situations.
Cross-country comparability, however, has shown to be dif-
ficult due to the observed heterogeneity in national regula-
tory practices in terms of determining asset base and level of 
remuneration. This could result in higher cost of capital and 
additional risk from the point of view of external investors, 
whose funds are indispensable to meet the substantial financ-
ing needs in energy infrastructures in the coming decades. 
Moreover, differing methodologies used to calculate the al-
lowed revenue could actually hamper adequate investments 
regarding projects that have a regional (i.e. cross-border) im-
pact. Especially in the electricity sector we face an increasing 
need to build long-distance transmission lines. Competition 
between corridors (and thus between TSOs from different 
Member States) can imply that the grid might be expanded 
where an investor gets a more favorable return. Finally, besides 
various exogenous factors that are beyond the control of TSOs 
and differences in internal operating efficiency, heterogeneity 
in national regulatory practices leads to a situation where for 
the same volume of assets different authorized revenues will be 
calculated, which in turn results in varying transmission costs 
and tariff levels. 
Our recommendations for future EU involvement:
•	 We see neither the need nor solid justification for an EU-
wide harmonization of the regulation of TSO revenues. 
Nevertheless, we recommend that decisions regarding the 
realization of projects with a pan-European impact should 
be taken on the EU level instead of being the result of a 
reaction to rates-of-return settled by national regulators in 
different Member States. Where a regionally specific solu-
tion has to be found (e.g. offshore grid), decentralized co-
operation and coordination are appropriate. 
•	 ACER should take the responsibility for benchmarking na-
tional practices and formulate an opinion about the appro-
priateness of various methodologies employed. Transpar-
ency (i.e. reporting) standards need to be extended.  
•	 In view of the amount of predicted investment needs, in-
novative solutions to trigger investments (e.g. competitive 
tendering or a European tariff component) should be con-
sidered to become common tools, too. 
EU involvement in electricity transmission grid 
tarification
There is wide heterogeneity regarding electricity transmission 
tariff structures among EU Member States. This does hamper 
both adequate investments and efficient competition. While 
the EU has defined general principles of tarification, there is 
little EU involvement with respect to tariff design except for 
some harmonization of the maximal average G-component. 
The existing ITC mechanism is an ex-post instrument which 
is intended to compensate TSOs for the costs resulting from 
hosting cross-border flows of electricity. Apart from some 
methodological weaknesses, it is not designed to incentivize 
the timely realization of grid investments or to allocate costs of 
new infrastructures. These issues are expected to be addressed 
by the proposed Energy Infrastructure Package for projects of 
pan-European interest; however, we identified some factors 
that might hamper the successful implementation and effec-
tiveness of this new regulation.
Our recommendations for future EU involvement:
•	 To increase transparency, the first area of harmonization 
should involve the clear definition of which cost compo-
nents transmission tariffs should contain. They should only 
include costs related to transmission network infrastruc-
ture. 
•	 Transmission tariffs should be allocated as far as possible 
based on the principle of cost causality. Locational signals 
should be introduced, taking into account national system 
specificities, being calculated based on sound methodolo-
gies and providing reliable ex-ante signals. The provision 
of time signals can be considered, too. To give economic 
signals to generators, obviously a certain share of the tariff 
needs to be paid by them. To avoid a distortion in competi-
tion, the EU should fix an average share of the G/L compo-
nent; thus, introduce a minimum G-component.
•	 The behavior of grid users in the competitive sector should 
not be distorted, i.e. transmission tariffs covering the long-
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term cost of infrastructure should not be charged based 
on energy transported (i.e. in €/MWh) but instead be paid 
based on booked capacity or lump-sum, computed sepa-
rately for different types of grid users in different areas so 
that charges properly reflect the network-related relevant 
characteristics of the network users.
•	 The EU should call for the removal of the legal barriers that 
might impede grid investments where strong geographical 
asymmetries in costs (i.e. investment needs) and benefits 
occur. It is necessary that third parties can invest where 
incumbent TSOs do not show interest to realize identified 
priority projects. 
•	 Finally, given the uneven distribution of benefits among 
stakeholders arising from increased interconnection ca-
pacities and the concern that national regulators tend to 
protect domestic consumers from rising prices, effective 
means have to be found to incentivize NRAs to support the 
development of identified priority projects. 
EU involvement in gas transmission grid 
tarification 
In the natural gas sector, heterogeneity in tariff structures 
does not hamper adequate investments while it might cer-
tainly hamper efficient competition. There are more than 30 
entry-exit zones with mainly administratively determined 
borders. Furthermore, systematic bias exists in the form of a 
cross-subsidization between short-distance transmission and 
long-distance transportation; domestic consumers tend to 
cross-subsidize transit flows. Other obstacles to functioning 
competition include contractual congestion, inefficient pric-
ing of non-standard products, a persisting lack of backhaul 
capacities, or the limited compatibility of capacity products of-
fered. The implementation of new legislation (i.e. Third Pack-
age, Network Code on capacity allocation mechanisms) will 
substantially increase transparency and compatibility and fa-
cilitate natural gas trade and competition. However, it does not 
address all obstacles listed above. 
Our recommendations for future EU involvement:
•	 The EU should set principles for determining the ideal 
size of entry-exit zones, but let concerned NRAs and TSOs 
agree on the result. Boundaries of price zones should reflect 
the technical and economic conditions rather than politi-
cal borders; mergers of market areas shall be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis based on expected economic benefits 
and costs. Once market areas are merged, there are good 
economic reasons to implement a system of common tarifi-
cation. The role for the EU here should be limited to support 
sound agreements between the respective stakeholders. The 
actual implementation of harmonization of tariff structures 
and definition of a mechanism to compensate TSOs can be 
managed at the regional level.  
•	 We recommend some harmonization in natural gas trans-
mission tarification to ensure that the breakdown of costs 
among grid users and among entry- and exit points is 
designed so that the principle of cost-reflectiveness is re-
spected as far as possible. Adequate discounts on short-haul 
transports should be encouraged and an asymmetric re-
allocation of costs such that ‘captive’ domestic consumers 
have to bear disproportionately high costs, shall be prohib-
ited. 
•	 The EU, through ACER, should formulate a set of ‘good 
practice guidelines’ regarding natural gas transmission 
tarification. Entry- and exit charges should be actively used 
to provide locational signals to grid users wherever this is 
economically reasonable. Commodity-related components 
should reflect short-run marginal costs in order to avoid 
distortions in the behavior of shippers in the commod-
ity market and network tariffs should clearly be identified, 
containing only those cost elements that are related to the 
transmission activity (i.e. infrastructure investment and op-
eration).
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Summary of the findings
Regulation of TSO 
revenues
Electricity transmission 
tariffs
Natural gas transmission 
tariffs
Heterogeneity hampers 
adequate investments?
Probably not for purely national 
infrastructures 
Probably yes Probably not
Probably yes for infrastructures 
with regional impact
Heterogeneity distorts 
competition?
Possibly yes Probably yes Probably yes
New legislation – once en-
forced – solves the issues?
Probably not Probably not Probably not
Recommendations on 
future EU involvement in a 
nutshell
# No need for EU-wide harmoni-
zation
# Decisions on realization of 
projects with pan-European 
impact to be taken at EU level; 
decentralized cooperation of all 
relevant stakeholders where a 
regionally specific solution is re-
quired (e.g. offshore grid)
# Benchmarking of national 
practices through ACER
# Consideration of innovative 
solutions to trigger investment 
(competitive tendering, EU tariff 
component)
# Definition of cost components 
to be included in tariff
# Allocation based on principle 
of cost causality ➜ implemen-
tation of locational signals and 
consideration of time signals
# Introduction of a minimum G-
component
# Transmission tariffs covering 
long-term infrastructure costs 
not to be charged in €/MWh
# Removal of legal barriers that 
might impede investment
# Incentivization of NRAs to sup-
port development of identified 
priority projects
# EU-wide principles for determi-
nation of ideal size of entry-exit 
zones
# Breakdown of costs among 
grid users and among entry- and 
exit points such that principle of 
cost-reflectiveness is respected 
as far as possible
# Formulation of “good practice 
guidelines”
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